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Institutional practices undermining citizen agency and infringing on individual freedoms 
are typically associated with authoritarian countries. However, they are also proliferating 
in Western democracies. This article redefines data-based surveillance as a “Western” 
authoritarian and illiberal practice in the digital realm, resulting from state–industry 
collaboration and alienated from accountability mechanisms. Straddling critical data 
studies and surveillance studies, the article explores these dynamics of surveillance in the 
West by focusing on two dimensions: the institutionalization of governmental practices in 
law and the societal normalization of surveillance in popular cultural practices. It thus 
investigates the renegotiation of the boundaries of state power along two axes—top down 
and bottom up. It connects the notions of “authoritarian and illiberal practices” and 
“surveillance cultures,” asking how the former are produced, negotiated, and legitimized 
and reviewing their consequences for citizens and civil society. Based on empirical data 
from two projects exploring the interplay between citizenship and surveillance, the article 
argues that acts of authoritarianism in the West are institutionalized at the intersection of 
top-down governmental practices and bottom-up popular reactions. 
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Some countries have erected electronic barriers that prevent their people from accessing 
portions of the world’s networks. They’ve expunged words, names, and phrases from 
search engine results. They have violated the privacy of citizens who engage in non-violent 
                                               
1 “Through a glass, darkly” refers to a biblical passage from the New Testament (1 Corinthians 13:12) that 
can be translated as, “Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror.” It is also the title of a 2006 novel 
by crime writer Donna Leon, where the hero investigates the entities literally “muddying the waters” of the 
Venice lagoon.  
 
Arne Hintz: hintza@cardiff.ac.uk 
Stefania Milan: S.Milan@uva.nl 
Date submitted: 2017–12–07 
3940  Arne Hintz and Stefania Milan International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
political speech. These actions contravene the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
which tells us that all people have the right “to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” With the spread of these restrictive 
practices, a new information curtain is descending across much of the world. (Clinton, 
2010, p. 4) 
 
As this quote by then–U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton illustrates, institutional practices that 
undermine citizen agency and limit political pluralism are often associated with authoritarian countries. In 
literature, authoritarianism has been connected to centralized power structures, a lack of accountability of 
the state to its citizens, and repression of political dissidence (Linz, 1964). Authoritarian regimes are typically 
associated with political systems that differ from Western forms of democracy: In her famous speech on 
Internet freedoms, Clinton explicitly referred to government policies and regulatory acts in, among others, 
Iran, China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Egypt. However, “authoritarian practices” targeting citizens by 
“disabling their access to information and/or disabling their voice” (Glasius, 2018, p. 527) are increasingly 
observed in the professed democratic countries of the West. This is particularly visible in the area that 
Clinton focused on to draw new demarcation lines between a democratic and an authoritarian world: Internet 
freedoms, namely, the broad range of human rights as they apply to the digital, such as free expression, 
association, assembly, and privacy online (Freedom Online Coalition, n.d.). Although surveillance and 
censorship have long existed in democratic states, the inadequacy of distinguishing between a free and a 
nonfree world on the Internet became particularly apparent with the Snowden leaks, which demonstrated 
the pervasive monitoring of data traces by the U.S. and UK security agencies. The revelations uncovered 
not just the widespread interception of data traffic but also operations targeted against democratic 
institutions and civil society organizations that included hacking servers, reducing technological security, 
and spreading misinformation (Greenwald, 2014).  
 
We follow Glasius (2018) in changing the perspective from “classic” authoritarian regimes to 
authoritarian practices as we analyze surveillance as both authoritarian and illiberal practice of and in the 
democratic West. We connect this notion to that of “surveillance culture” (Lyon, 2017), asking how the 
“active practice[s] of disrupting or sabotaging accountability” (Glasius, 2018, p. 521) emerging in the West 
are produced, negotiated, and legitimized. More specifically, the article advances the claim that the 
authoritarian dimension of surveillance is institutionalized at the intersection of two dynamics: (a) the top-
down dynamic of policy reform that followed the Snowden revelations and enables wider data collection and 
analysis by state agencies, empowering the state at the expense of civic rights, and (b) the bottom-up 
dynamic of public responses to massive data collection that have facilitated the normalization of surveillance 
and the consolidation of a surveillance culture while harboring emerging resistance tactics. To this end, we 
bring the disciplines of surveillance studies and critical data studies into a dialogue with emerging work on 
authoritarian practices within international relations. This notion, we argue, allows us to interpret the turn 
to blanket surveillance in Western democracies, exploring the ongoing (re)negotiation of the boundaries of 
state power. Our goal is to offer both empirical grounding and conceptual development in the context of an 
emerging critique of simplistic distinctions between an allegedly free and democratic world and a sphere of 
authoritarian regimes. Our focus is on Internet freedoms as the thematic field where such distinctions have 
been promoted most prominently over the past decade.  
 
International Journal of Communication 12(2018)  “Through a Glass, Darkly”  3941 
The article is based on findings from two multiyear research projects that have addressed Internet 
surveillance and massive data collection in liberal democracies in the European Union and the Americas. It 
is organized as follows. First, we illustrate the historical trajectory of digital freedoms and restrictions, 
elucidate the conceptual tenets of the article, and describe our data sets. Next, we take the top-down 
perspective, exploring the making of surveillance policies in the West with a focus on the accountability of 
states toward their citizens. We then analyze authoritarian practices from a bottom-up perspective, 
surveying both the public resignation that followed the normalization of surveillance and emerging tactics 
of resistance. We conclude by bringing our findings to bear on the notion of authoritarian practices, reflecting 
on advantages and challenges of transposing this concept to liberal democracies. 
 
Exploring Authoritarian Practices in the Digital Realm 
 
Digital Freedoms and Restrictions: A Rapidly Shifting Landscape 
 
“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel . . . leave us alone,” 
cyberlibertarian activist John Perry Barlow (1996, para. 1) famously proclaimed in A Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace. With many of its key protocols developed outside established institutions and 
with the goal to facilitate end-to-end communication, the decentralized design of the Internet promised 
enhanced interaction between individuals and challenged the influence of traditional forms of authority (cf. 
Abbate, 1999). Creating “a world where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no matter how 
singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or conformity,” the Internet was hoped to represent a 
“citizen-designed, citizen-controlled worldwide communications network” able to “revitalize the public 
sphere” (Rheingold, 1993, pp. 14–15). On and through this new infrastructure, “the people formerly known 
as the audience” (Rosen, 2006, para. 1) could create and share their own content, increasingly without 
expert mediation. As a space of interaction, the Internet generated new forms of networked, collaborative 
and participatory production (Benkler, 2006) and lowered the costs of association and organization (Shirky, 
2008). It also helped advance new understandings of digital citizenship based on people’s self-enactment 
of their role in society through digital acts (Isin & Ruppert, 2015; Mossberger, Tolbert, & McNeal, 2007). 
 
However, the supposedly empowering features of the Internet have been progressively met by the 
expansion of the influence of both state and corporations, which have sought control over cyberspace 
(Deibert, 2013; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). Internet regulation, censorship, and state cyberpolicing capacities 
have increased significantly (Nye, 2011). These restrictions have included the virtual separation of national 
networks from the transnational Internet and, thus, the demarcation of virtual national borders, as in the 
case of the Great Firewall of China (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2008, 2011). During times of 
protests and uprisings, governments are now routinely closing down online services or interrupting 
connections to the outside world. The Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project has documented Internet 
shutdowns in 30 countries from January 2016 to September 2017 (Access Now, 2017; see also Freyburg & 
Garbe, 2018; Wagner, 2018). Often “the targets (victims) are active domestic civic society movements” 
(Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 2011, p. 220). Within national borders, filtering and blocking content that 
transcends moral, religious, or political limits set by governments or religious authorities have become 
common practice. Some of this was pioneered by governments in the Middle East and Asia, but Western 
countries have rapidly expanded their censorship and surveillance capacities (Deibert et al., 2008). 
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FinFisher, commercial software used to secretly access the machines of suspected criminals to steal 
passwords and record conversations, has been located in countries as diverse as Canada, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, India, Bahrain, Vietnam, Turkmenistan, and the United States, among others 
(Marquis-Boire, Marczak, Guarnieri, & Scott-Railton, 2013). Meanwhile, the creation of an extensive 
censorship architecture for accepted forms of content restrictions (e.g., blocking child pornography) serves 
also the purpose of normalizing the practice of wider restrictions. But “once the tools of censorship are in place, 
the temptation for authorities to employ them for a wide range of purposes are large” (Deibert, 2009, p. 327).  
 
As private entities are enlisted to implement content restrictions and surveillance and set their own 
rules on core issues of freedom of expression, we observe “a shift of the responsibility for monitoring and 
policing Internet conduct onto strategically positioned private sector intermediaries” (Mueller, 2010, p. 149). 
With social media platforms mediating people’s access to the digital public sphere, such intermediaries 
become gatekeepers and take on the role of regulators. State policy is thus complemented by the 
privatization of policy, or private ordering (Hintz, 2016). This interaction is particularly prevalent in the area 
of surveillance, where states use the “data mine” (Andrejevic, 2012) of online platforms, as the Snowden 
leaks demonstrated, to develop detailed knowledge about their citizens, for example, by tracking the vast 
pool of data generated through social media platforms for “open source intelligence” operations (Trottier, 
2015). As a consequence, chilling effects on online speech, whereby surveillance deters people from 
engaging in legal (or even desirable) online activities because they fear punishment or criminal sanction and 
do not trust the legal system to protect their innocence (Penney, 2016), have been observed. As we shall 
see, these chilling effects undermine critical debate and dissenting voices (Hampton et al., 2014).  
 
Learning From Surveillance Studies and Critical Data Studies  
 
Two interdisciplinary fields of inquiry, surveillance studies and critical data studies, help us to 
interpret these developments. Surveillance studies has documented how “all manner of everyday activities 
are recorded, checked, traced and monitored” (Lyon, 2007, p. 454). Theoretical approaches to surveillance 
have been heavily influenced by classic concepts such as Bentham’s (1843) panopticon, emphasizing the 
role and position of the watchful eye of an authority, thus stressing the hierarchical relationship of power 
between the agents and objects of surveillance, whereas other (and often more recent) understandings of 
surveillance have incorporated the active role of those surveilled in complex processes of “veillance” (Bakir, 
2015). As Bauman and Lyon (2012) noted:  
 
Much of the personal information vacuumed so vigorously by organizations is actually 
made available by people using their cell phones, shopping in malls, travelling on vacation, 
being entertained or surfing the internet. We swipe our cards, repeat our postcodes and 
show our ID routinely, automatically, willingly. (p. 12)  
 
Meanwhile, the rise of what has been termed “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2015) has been accompanied 
by pervasive logics of data accumulation promoting the collapse of previously disassociated data contexts—
with ever-newer threats to citizen privacy. 
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Lyon (2017) has conceptualized this notion as the rise of a surveillance culture, whereby 
surveillance “is no longer merely something external that impinges on our lives. It is something that 
everyday citizens comply with—willingly and wittingly, or not—negotiate, resist, engage with, and, in novel 
ways, even initiate and desire” (p. 825). Such culture manifests itself in corresponding social imaginaries, 
or shared understandings and normative commitments “constructed through everyday involvement with 
surveillance as well as from new reports and popular media” (p. 829). Surveillance technologies have not 
just proliferated; they have become fully embedded in everyday practices and “in the norms and institutions 
of society” (Murakami Wood & Webster, 2009, p. 264). The use of digital devices, and the mere physical 
existence in heavily digitized spaces such as smart cities, inevitably lead to the generation of data by citizens 
and thus to the—sometimes active and willing, sometimes passive and unaware—participation of people in 
surveillance regimes, what Albrechtslund (2008) has referred to as “participatory surveillance.” The 
distributed and often opaque nature of contemporary “surveillance assemblages” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000) 
makes it difficult to “pinpoint the locus of responsibility for surveillance processes” (Lyon, Haggerty, & Ball, 
2012, p. 9).  
 
Our understanding of the norms and implications of contemporary forms of surveillance have been 
further enhanced through the interdisciplinary field of critical data studies, engaging more specifically with 
the rise of big data and the associated algorithmic processes (cf. Dalton & Thatcher, 2014). Scholars have 
explored emerging “data assemblages” (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2015), developing a critical perspective on how 
the epistemological and ontological implications of data-driven processes may (re)constitute both knowledge 
and subjectivity and, in the process, democracy and the society at large (e.g., Baym, 2013; boyd & 
Crawford, 2012). Emphasis has been put on the role of private actors in promoting the monitoring of the 
citizenry, investigating the “politics of” algorithms and platforms (Gillespie, 2014) and the subtending logics 
prompting people to engage in predetermined actions such as sharing (van Dijck & Poell, 2013). The use of 
data for surveillance purposes, or “dataveillance,” has been recognized as an intrinsic component of today’s 
“culture of connectivity” (van Dijck, 2013). Corporate and government bodies alike turn citizens into data 
doubles that enable social sorting and alter access to resources and life chances (Lyon, 2014; van Dijck, 
2014) and can produce inequality and discrimination (Gangadharan, 2012; Noble, 2018). 
 
Scholars have explored how novel subjectivities and “data publics” (Ruppert, 2015) are co-
constituted in interaction with algorithmic modes of control (Cheney-Lippold, 2011). Yet, although a “Big 
Data divide” (Andrejevic, 2014) exists between the “surveillance-industrial complex” (Ball & Snider, 2013) 
and citizens as the objects of surveillance, people have also reclaimed agency and carved out spaces to 
engage in resistance and creative subversion of massive data collection (Couldry & Powell, 2014; Milan, 
2018). These vary from “reactive” tactics, such as the adoption of encryption and anonymization tools as 
technical solutions to widespread surveillance, to “proactive” approaches such as “sousveillance,” or the 
turning of surveillance against the surveillant (Milan & van der Velden, 2016; cf. Mann, Nolan, & Wellman, 
2003).  
Citizen Monitoring and Dataveillance as Authoritarian Practices 
 
The notions of authoritarian and illiberal practices offer a fruitful lens through which to reflect on 
the role of the state in today’s dataveillance. Traditionally, authoritarianism has been attributed a systemic 
character, with the literature emphasizing the role of a central authority within defined geographic 
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boundaries (Linz, 1964), but focusing on practices allows for the necessary flexibility. Authoritarian practices 
are patterns of action oriented to incapacitate citizens’ access to information, “through filtering, 
misinformation, and secrecy that is not exceptional and not bound by procedure,” or to voice, “through 
censorship, intimidation or punishment” (Glasius & Michaelsen, 2018, this Special Section). They alter “the 
relationship between the actor and the forum” and are made possible by “public-private authoritarian 
partnerships” (Glasius, 2018, pp. 517–521) whereby state agencies obtain user data from 
telecommunication companies—with or without court warrant (see, e.g., Parsons, 2014). They are typically 
justified with reasons of national security, therefore kept hidden from the public scrutiny and alienated from 
traditional accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, Glasius and Michaelsen (2018) distinguish between 
“authoritarian practices,” which are marked by secrecy and the sabotage of accountability, and “illiberal 
practices,” which infringe on the protection of the autonomy and dignity of a person. As we will discuss, 
both aspects can be observed in the institutionalization of surveillance through top-down and bottom-up 
dynamics.  
 
Using the notions of authoritarian and illiberal practices to interpret the diffused character of 
surveillance in Western democracies and its effects on the state–citizens relation is useful for at least three 
reasons. First, they allow us to “go beyond a single-state context and recognize such phenomena as 
transnational illiberalism or public-private authoritarian partnerships” (Glasius, 2018, p. 517). As 
exemplified by PRISM, the surveillance program revealed by Snowden and empowering the U.S. National 
Security Agency (NSA) to collect Internet traffic data from companies such as Google, these practices are 
often based on public–private cooperation. Second, the notion allows us to stress the “organizational and 
social context” (p. 524) in which these practices are embedded. Third, the concept evokes the severe 
consequences that disabling access to information or voice might have on citizens, as “authoritarian 
practices enable domination: they entail substantive and procedural rule-breaking, interfere with the 
preferences and inhibit the civic virtues of those to whom accountability is owed, and strictly control 
information flows” (p. 525). 
 
The engagement with surveillance as authoritarian and illiberal practice is embedded, moreover, 
in a broader social science literature that has addressed the implications of surveillance and data analytics 
for national and transnational politics and for state–citizen relations. Scholars of international relations and 
security studies, for example, have explored the societal consequences of the transformation of Internet 
users into suspects in the context of big data surveillance (Bauman et al., 2014) and the paradigm of 
preemption that is advanced through the digital mode of prediction (Aradau & Blanke, 2017). Similarly, 
recent works on digital citizenship have investigated the implications of pervasive surveillance for citizen 
agency and state–citizen power shifts (Hintz, Dencik, & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018; Isin & Ruppert, 2015). 
 
The Data Sets 
 
This article draws from empirical data gathered in the context of two interdisciplinary projects. The 
first, “Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK State-Media-Citizen Relations After the Snowden 
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Leaks” (Cardiff University, 2014‒16),2 analyzed the implications of the Snowden leaks across the four 
thematic areas of technology, policy, news media, and civil society. Focusing on the United Kingdom as one 
of the countries most implicated in the Snowden revelations, the researchers investigated the role of 
technical infrastructures and standards, reforms in the legal and regulatory framework of surveillance, the 
media coverage of the leaks, and public knowledge and attitudes about surveillance. The research involved 
a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, including policy document analysis, focus groups 
with a cross-section of the British public, media content analysis, and more than 40 expert interviews with 
policy makers, industry representatives, digital rights activists, and other relevant stakeholders. Here, we 
draw particularly from 24 expert interviews and 10 focus groups that addressed the policy environment of 
and popular reactions to surveillance.3 The second project, “Data Activism: The Politics of Big Data According 
to Civil Society” (DATACTIVE; University of Amsterdam, 2015–20), explores citizens’ engagement with 
datafication and massive data collection, with a focus on the organized civil society.4 To date, researchers 
have interviewed more than 120 digital rights activists, human rights defenders, and software developers 
from European countries and the Americas in view of understanding how users with varying degrees of tech 
expertise engage with datafication and how citizen participation is being reformatted as a consequence of 
blanket surveillance. This article draws from a subset of interviews conducted at digital rights events in 
Europe.  
 
In what follows, we use findings from these projects to underpin a discussion of two dimensions of 
surveillance as authoritarian and illiberal practice: state policy and public responses. We do not suggest that 
surveillance today is fully captured by this dichotomy, but it uncovers processes and interactions that help 
us understand the particular configuration of authoritarian and illiberal practices in the West. Recognizing 
the multiple dynamics of data assemblages and dataveillance, we zoom in on these two perspectives to 
identify specific dimensions that entrench and institutionalize authoritarian and illiberal practices in the 
digital realm. 
 
Authoritarian Practices, Top Down: State Surveillance and Policy 
 
The Snowden revelations, leaking (from June 2013 onward) classified information about 
government surveillance programs, represented a significant historical juncture in many respects. They 
demonstrated the almost limitless capabilities of intelligence services to track, record, and analyze people’s 
online interactions, thereby changing our understanding of the Internet and, arguably, digital citizenship 
(Hintz et al., 2018). They also contributed to altering an international discourse that had merely focused on 
restrictions to online communication by authoritarian states, mostly on the Asian continent, as seen in 
Clinton’s milestone address, while the activities of institutions such as the NSA and the UK Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had received less scrutiny, or at least faced less open criticism. Their 
                                               
2 See http://www.dcssproject.net/. Research results have been published in a Special Issue of the 
International Journal of Communication (Hintz, Dencik, & Wahl-Jorgensen, 2017). 
3 Findings have been summarized by Hintz and Brown (2017) and Dencik and Cable (2017). 
4 See https://data-activism.net/. The project has received funding from the European Research Council 
(ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. 
639379-DATACTIVE).  
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role was eventually put into question as leading global media organizations such as The Guardian, Der 
Spiegel, and The New York Times began to publish detailed accounts of the extensive surveillance programs 
affecting Western democracies. They showed how security agencies in democratic states harvest data from 
the Internet’s backbone cables (through programs such as Tempora and Upstream), collect messages and 
user geolocations (through programs such as Dishfire and Co-traveller), analyze data troves (with tools such 
as Xkeyscore), break encryption, weaken the security of software products, and hack into 
telecommunications services (Greenwald, 2014). In the aftermath of the Snowden leaks, the organization 
Reporters Without Borders (2014) named the NSA and GCHQ among the main “enemies of the Internet” 
and GCHQ as the “world champions of surveillance,” highlighting “the schizophrenic attitude towards online 
freedoms that prevails in some countries,” singling out “democracies that have traditionally claimed to 
respect fundamental freedoms” (para. 1).  
 
Beyond exposing state agencies, the Snowden leaks uncovered the role of the industry, and social 
media platforms in particular, in the surveillance machine, showing how the comprehensive state access to 
personal data has been facilitated through public–private partnerships often handled in secrecy. Security 
agencies have been shown to collect data from the servers of large Internet companies such as Google, 
Facebook, Apple, and Yahoo—with or without their consent (see programs such as Prism, Muscular, and 
Squeaky Dolphin)—which was made possible by the data-oriented business model of social media 
corporations and other platforms (Trottier & Lyon, 2012).  
 
The Snowden leaks brought to the forefront of public debate the question of the accountability of 
state institutions toward their citizens—or the break thereof (cf. Glasius, 2018). Following Glasius and 
Michaelsen (2018), the dataveillance schemes described above can be understood as illiberal practice by 
state powers resulting in consistent “infringements on individual autonomy and dignity” (this Special 
Section). The secrecy surrounding them and the lack of public accountability, meanwhile, point to their 
authoritarian characteristics. An example here may be the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
which operates in closed hearings, withholds its records from the public, and does not have the affected 
parties represented in court (Greenwald, 2013). Of particular relevance, then, is the legal and regulatory 
environment that might provide both safeguards against governmental overreach and transparency of 
surveillance powers and offer citizens the opportunity to affect policy reform. And indeed, the turmoil that 
followed the leaks triggered official review processes in several countries and generated pressure toward 
policy reform. Some countries implemented partial but promising policy changes. The Brazilian Marco Civil 
da Internet of 2014 provided stronger protection of citizens’ privacy and anonymity online (Medeiros & 
Bygrave, 2015), and the EU General Data Protection Regulation of 2018 expanded the protection of citizens’ 
personal data, for example, by limiting the use and sharing of personal data by companies and mandating 
data protection by design (Mayer-Schoenberger & Padova, 2016). However, most countries, rather than 
pushing back on state powers, have extended the legal use of surveillance capabilities by state agencies. 
New laws to strengthen surveillance powers were adopted in France (2015), Germany (2017), Denmark 
(2017), and the Netherlands (2018). The United Kingdom—the country that one of our empirical research 
projects has focused on—offers a paradigmatic case of how the development of new legislation points to 
ambiguous results regarding authoritarian and illiberal practices in Western countries. Following the 
Snowden leaks, the official independent reviewer of existing antiterrorism legislation criticized the 
surveillance laws of the country as “obscure,” “undemocratic,” and “intolerable,” calling for a significant 
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review and redevelopment (Anderson, 2015). Other parties demanded a democratic license for the 
surveillance activities of intelligence agencies (Royal United Services Institute, 2015). In response to such 
reviews and to public critique and legal challenges against the existing regulatory framework, the UK 
government initiated substantial policy reform. The Investigatory Powers Act of 2016 combined the 
previously fragmented legislative framework of data collection and analysis into one comprehensive law. 
Addressing a wide range of surveillance practices—from bulk data collection to “computer network 
exploitation” (i.e., hacking)—it opened up many of the traditionally secret surveillance measures to public 
scrutiny and oversight. However, rather than limiting state surveillance powers in light of the Snowden 
leaks, it confirmed, legalized, and expanded existing practices. This includes, for example, the collection of 
Internet connection records (i.e., people’s Web browsing habits), which are now available to a wide range 
of authorities upon request; the removal of encryption; and the legalization of hacking by the state into the 
devices of citizens (Hintz & Brown, 2017). 
 
As research from the Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society project shows, most stakeholders 
agreed that the new legislation increases transparency, with one surveillance critic even suggesting that the 
act may be “the most transparent bit of legislation that Britain’s ever had” (interview with digital rights 
activist, February 2016). Moreover, the process of developing the legislation provided opportunity for 
nongovernmental actors to contribute to the policy debate. It strengthened, particularly, the role of digital 
rights organizations in debates on national security, where they were increasingly recognized as legitimate 
actors with relevant expertise (interview with digital rights activist, January 2016). This would suggest that 
policy reform in the United Kingdom, although advancing illiberal rules, has enhanced accountability and 
cannot, therefore, be interpreted as authoritarian. In effect, however, the impact of surveillance critics, civil 
society, and other stakeholders on policy development was very limited. Although a wide range of actors 
were invited to contribute through, for example, the submission of public comments, most of these were 
neglected during the development and revision process. Parliamentary control suffered from a lack of “the 
time and exposure to be able to get sufficient knowledge” (interview with UK parliamentarian, March 2016) 
to fully understand the issues and, in some cases, pressure by government “to defend the agencies” 
(interview with UK parliamentarian, February 2016). Accountability was thus maintained on the surface but 
disguised in the actual process of policy reform.  
 
Instead, the security and intelligence community enjoyed prominent access to policy makers and 
consideration of their concerns. For example, the time frame for data retention was based on a suggestion 
by the National Crime Agency (interview with former security officer, February 2016) and was not amended 
despite heavy criticism from most other stakeholders. The key role attributed in the process to the Home 
Office—which is responsible for domestic security and, hence, has a strong interest in expanding 
surveillance—together with the close access for security agencies to decision makers shaped both the 
general direction and the details of policy reform. Key officers inside the Home Office acted, according to a 
UK parliamentarian (interview, February 2016), “not as a filter but as an advocate” for the expansion of 
surveillance powers. Although most of the publicly available consultations were critical of the draft law, its 
supporters thus had internal communication channels—a “hotline” to lawmakers (interview with UK 
parliamentarian, February 2016)—at their disposal to advance their interests. The limited debate that did 
take place was led by public relations efforts of intelligence and security agencies, and the institutional 
processes of balancing benefits and risks by incorporating multiple perspectives were underdeveloped. Both 
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chambers of Parliament adopted the governmental proposal despite a lack of substantial revisions that had 
been demanded even by parliamentary review committees (Hintz & Brown, 2017). 
 
Our research shows how, according to stakeholders and observers, an extensive public discussion 
on the future of surveillance policy did not take place and that the policy reform process lacked both popular 
legitimation and wider public debate. Civil society activists and parliamentarians from oppositional parties 
regarded the main purpose of the new law as “justifying essentially previous secret practice” and aiming “to 
legitimize existing behavior rather than to enter into a debate about what should be done” (interview with 
digital rights activist, February 2016). The top-down dimension of governmental practice in one of the 
Western countries most implicated in the Snowden revelations was thus infused by both illiberal and 
authoritarian practices. In the following section, we investigate how these processes are reflected in citizen 
behavior. 
 
Authoritarian Practices, Bottom Up:  
Surveillance Culture, Resignation, and . . . Resistance 
 
The top-down processes of establishing, practicing, and legitimizing surveillance are mirrored in 
bottom-up dynamics that include active engagement with, or passive acceptance of, the pervasive collection 
and analysis of personal data by the state-industry complex. As noted before, scholars have suggested that 
users partake in systems and processes that render personal lives increasingly transparent to a range of 
organizations whose activities are not necessarily transparent to them (Lyon, 2015). The internalization of 
surveillance as “part of a whole way of life” and “of everyday reflections on how things are” (Lyon, 2017, p. 
825) transforms also our understandings of key practices in digital society, for example, by reinterpreting 
“sharing” as exposure of personal data to anyone, including state and corporate actors (van Dijck, 2013). 
Citizen participation is, not least, advanced through the attraction of the platforms and devices that generate 
and collect data (Harcourt, 2015). The prevailing consent model requires that users agree to comprehensive 
data collection if they wish to partake in digital life through most platforms, turning individuals into 
“unwitting data subjects” forced to carry the burden of privacy protection (Edwards & Veale, 2017). 
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the public actively consents to data collection 
practices or that citizens are apathetic bystanders to the technologies that envelop their daily activities. An 
increasing number of studies in the aftermath of the Snowden leaks has found that there are significant 
levels of unease, confusion, and concern in relation to how data is generated and collected, what it is used 
for and by whom, and how users can address these challenges. Respondents conveyed a general sense of 
lack of control over how data travels and a wish for more information about the data practices of 
organizations, revealing that average citizens tend to feel disempowered by the choices they can make in a 
digital environment (Eurobarometer, 2015; Information Commissioner’s Office, 2015). Similarly, survey 
data from the Washington-based Pew Research Center showed how, amid the Cambridge Analytica case 
exposing Facebook’s questionable data reuse practices, people struggle to understand the scope of the data 
collected about them by social media companies (Rainie, 2018). The empirical results of our research 
projects provide further evidence for these trends. In focus groups with members of the British public, 
people expressed concern about surveillance and data collection but, at the same time, assumed the 
inevitability of data-driven privacy violations in digital environments and saw little possibility to challenge, 
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circumvent, or mediate the data collected on them. Focus group participants noted being “uncomfortable” 
and “uneasy” not just about surveillance but also about their lack of knowledge of their own privacy (Dencik 
& Cable, 2017). A lack of understanding, combined with concerns about surveillance but a feeling of 
disempowerment, points to what Draper and Turow (2017) have posited as a “sociology of digital 
resignation” and Dencik and Cable (2017) have called as “surveillance realism,” in which people resign to 
ubiquitous data collection in more and more aspects of social life. Rather than actively consenting or 
passively accepting surveillance, they feel unable to properly negotiate the reality of data collection.  
 
The popular confusion about surveillance practices has been underpinned by shortcomings in 
mediated public debate and the predominant narrative of security that defines it. Research as part of the 
Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society project demonstrated how media coverage has, by and large, 
justified surveillance and downplayed implications for citizen rights and civil liberties. Whereas blogs and 
new types of online news media have often provided a more differentiated perspective on the subject, classic 
mainstream media have—apart from a few exceptions—been unable to enhance public knowledge and, 
instead, have normalized surveillance (Wahl-Jorgensen, Bennet, & Taylor, 2017). A lack of sufficient 
information, public understanding, and debate and, as a consequence, the disempowerment of citizens thus 
mirror authoritarian governmental practices. The secrecy and lack of accountability that typically 
characterize such practices are evidenced by the intersection of both dimensions. 
 
Snowden showed how politically active citizens can be particularly implicated when carrying out 
activities and expressing dissent in digital environments. Some of the leaked documents proved that 
government agencies in both the United States and the United Kingdom actively monitored political groups, 
including international organizations such as Medecins du Monde (Doctors of the World), Amnesty 
International, and Human Rights Watch, with a “watch-list” (Privacy International & Amnesty International, 
2015). Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service was spying for years on international journalists of, among 
others, The New York Times, Reuters, and the BBC (Baumgärtner, Knobbe, & Schindler, 2017). State 
surveillance practices have also extended to the monitoring of politically interested citizens, for example, 
with GCHQ tracking any visitor to the WikiLeaks site in the aftermath of WikiLeaks’ Cablegate publications 
in 2010 (Greenwald & Gallagher, 2014).  
 
The chilling effect of surveillance has particularly worrying consequences for these individuals and 
organizations. A survey of writers in the immediate aftermath of the Snowden leaks suggested that the 
revelations caused self-censorship (PEN, 2013). Further studies revealed a reluctance among citizens to 
engage in politically sensitive topics online, showing a decline in “privacy-sensitive” search terms on Google 
(Marthews & Tucker, 2017) and in page views of Wikipedia articles relating to terrorism (Penney, 2016). A 
“spiral of silence” in surveillance debates has been observed on social media (Hampton et al., 2014) and 
has affected also the expression of minority political views (Stoycheff, 2016). “Networked chilling effects” 
have been found as a consequence of merely being made aware of online regulatory actions, as people are 
scared of even hypothetical surveillance scenarios (Penney, 2017). As Greenwald (2014) argued, “mass 
surveillance kills dissent in a deeper and more important place as well, in the mind, where the individual 
trains him- or herself to think only in line with what is expected and demanded” (pp. 177–178). Findings 
from our research projects confirm this concern. Interviews with social justice activists have shown how the 
argument “nothing to hide, nothing to fear” has been internalized and how, therefore, distinctions are made 
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between different forms of dissent that may expect different levels of surveillance. Interviewees from several 
British civil society organizations noted that “we’ve got nothing to hide” and therefore felt less urgency to 
address the issue. Asked about the use of encryption technologies, several interviewees noted that it would 
be relevant mainly for the more radical groups, whereas their own organization should be safe because of 
its public and mainstream-oriented approach. In this way, surveillance can keep the mainstream in check 
while identifying more determined dissidents (Dencik & Cable, 2017).  
 
Although these effects can be observed in a significant portion of social justice activists that work 
on issues such as housing, racism, or the environment, those who are more directly engaged with the 
development of, or advocacy about, digital infrastructure are actively carving out spaces of resistance. For 
example, politically motivated software developers create technical solutions (e.g., privacy-aware operating 
systems such as Qubes and anonymity networks such as Tor) to empower ordinary users to use end-to-end 
encryption. In their own words, “we want people to feel that they have something to hide” (interview with 
privacy advocate, August 2017), and “we need to teach people how to protect themselves online” (interview 
with security developer, July 2017). The main challenges to this approach include the scalability of technical 
solutions; the scarce and intermittent funding supporting development and maintenance; translation to 
adapt the tools to local needs; “behavior change” at both the individual and the organizational level; and 
“building a community” of developers, users, and trainers “able to take things on their own” (interview with 
digital rights advocate, August 2017). In addition, the ongoing criminalization of privacy-related activities 
(see the 2016 Apple–FBI encryption dispute or the 2015 pronouncements by the United Kingdom and 
Australia about banning encrypted communication) results in a chilling effect even among tech-savvy people 
who are increasingly concerned about the risks of being associated with encryption. In particular, human 
rights defenders interviewed for DATACTIVE expressed their fear that in the near future the development 
and use of privacy- and anonymity-enhancing technology might be imperiled by actors who find such tools 
threatening or problematic.  
 
Further, a strong disconnect has been observed between technology activism and wider civil society 
concerns, with social justice activists outsourcing responses to surveillance concerns to digital rights and 
tech activists, and the latter tending toward solutions for individualized protection rather than societal 
transformation (Dencik, Hintz, & Cable, 2016). The Snowden leaks represented one of those “sneaky 
moments in which the ongoing divide between those engaged in struggles of social justice and those 
struggling for just technologies have been reshaped” (Aouragh, Gürses, Rocha, & Snelting, 2015, p. 208), 
but the delegation of technological concerns and solutions to the “progressive techies” (Aouragh et al., 
2015) remains firmly in place. Furthermore, the framing of privacy as a predominantly individual 
responsibility (Kazansky, 2015) jeopardizes a perspective on the societal process of datafication and the 
interests driving surveillance. If the dominant technological solutionism testifies to the prevalence of the 
“happy story about how technology will fix everything” (interview with digital rights advocate, July 2017), 
this approach risks excluding the large majority, turning user empowerment into “something that [only] the 
most privileged and sophisticated users are interested in, and those who are seeking . . . a vehicle to avoid 
regulation” (interview with digital rights advocate, September 2017). Complementing this overemphasis on 
technology, digital rights organizations address a somewhat broader societal dimension through advocacy 
campaigns, strategic litigation, and capacity building to empower individuals “so that people can use the 
technology to exercise their rights” (interview with digital rights advocate, March 2017). As part of this, 
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some have attempted to reframe privacy advocacy as “a movement of people who care about rights” 
(interview with privacy advocate, March 2017), thereby expanding its collective relevance beyond individual 
cyberhygiene. Similarly, RightsCon (https://www.rightscon.org/) rebranded itself as a conference series 
about “human rights in the digital age,” explicitly moving beyond the digital rights frame. However, strategies 
of resisting, circumventing, and changing the authoritarian practices discussed here are facing significant 
challenges. In particular, they have limitations in addressing popular reactions of digital resignation and 
surveillance realism outside a digitally literate minority, and therefore in resolving the uncertainty resulting 
from governmental secrecy and lack of accountability. They have been successful in exposing the illiberal 
nature of surveillance practices and, to some extent, the authoritarian tendencies of their implementation and 
in pointing to alternatives. On the other hand, the individualized and niche character of much of today’s digital 
activism has not hindered the emergence of widespread popular disempowerment, which is at the heart of the 
bottom-up dimension of authoritarian practices.  
 
Conclusion 
 
For a long time, digital authoritarian practices have been associated with nondemocratic regimes, 
which, as Clinton (2010) noted, “violate” and “violated the privacy of citizens” (p. 4). According to this 
perspective, “internet freedoms” and the “liberation technology” (Diamond, 2010) advanced by 
nonauthoritarian countries would provide a remedy against such practices, working as a vehicle of 
democratization in those parts of the world under authoritarian rule. However, as the Snowden leaks 
demonstrated, challenges to civic rights are now occurring across the world and throughout both 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. By conceptualizing surveillance as an authoritarian practice in the 
democratic West, we (a) presented an analysis that undermines political narrative seeking to divide the 
world into one with a free Internet and one where digital freedoms do not exist, (b) contextualized 
surveillance in the study of authoritarian practices, and (c) examined two dimensions that intersect in the 
emergence of authoritarian digital practices in the West. Reviewing qualitative data from two projects and 
placing it in the context of a broader range of studies, we argued that digital authoritarian practices are 
manifested through the interplay of two broad dynamics: the top-down dimension of governmental practices 
and policy and the bottom-up dimension of popular engagement with, and knowledge of, digital 
infrastructure. We showed how surveillance policies and policy making both affect civic rights and undermine 
the accountability of state power to citizens. By reviewing policy development and citizen engagement in the 
United Kingdom, one of the countries at the center of the post-Snowden surveillance debate, we exposed a 
lack of democratic process and public debate in the development of the recent surveillance law, the 
Investigatory Powers Act. By examining citizens’ reaction to and engagement with surveillance, we pointed to 
the emergence of digital resignation and a surveillance realism whereby a system without surveillance becomes 
ever harder to imagine, with its corollary of chilling effects on the democratic discourse and (technical) attempts 
at resistance emerging at the fringes of the system. Together, both dimensions revealed an ongoing process 
of undermining the accountability of the state toward its citizens and the persistence (and expansion) of 
challenges to the informed exercise of civic rights.  
 
We argue that an integrated perspective on both the top-down and the bottom-up dimensions can 
provide us with a mechanism for understanding the ways in which authoritarian practices are entrenched in 
democratic countries. The actions of state agencies and governmental policy development and their 
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reflection in citizen behavior offer a multifaceted understanding of the pervasiveness of authoritarian 
practices and of their societal institutionalization. This perspective, particularly, emphasizes the role of those 
who are often attributed a merely passive role: the citizens. If we are to adapt the notion of authoritarian 
practices to countries in which citizens enjoy many constitutional rights, we need to conceptualize a nuanced, 
layered role for those subjected to said practices. This article provides evidence for the need of a more 
differentiated perspective on authoritarianism that takes note of the wider diversity of practices and norms 
that are advanced across countries and political systems, including the democratic West. In times in which 
citizens view privacy merely “through a glass, darkly,” we believe it is particularly fruitful—and necessary—
to advance our understanding of authoritarian practices in this part of the world and to develop conceptual 
tools apt for the task.  
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